


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U.S. ARMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE (1945-1967)



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CHAPTER 8

THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961 (U)

26. (U) The Communist Threat

After the comparable calm of 1959, the Warsaw Pact members threatened in 1960 to sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.). Further tension developed when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sabotaged the May 1960 summit conference in Paris. After his inauguration in 1961, President John F. Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev held a summit conference on 3 and 4 June in Vienna. The conference failed to ease the existing tension, and Premier Khrushchev strongly reiterated the position that the U.S.S.R. would sign a peace treaty with the G.D.R., which would permanently divide Germany and make Berlin a demilitarized, free city. He threatened that he would sign such a unilateral treaty unless Soviet demands for the negotiation of a peace treaty with the "two Germanics" were met within six months.

The United States, acting in agreement with the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, rejected the demands. The Western Allies stated that a unilateral Soviet-G.D.R. peace treaty would be illegal and that they would maintain access rights to Berlin even if such a treaty was concluded. To prepare for any eventuality, President Kennedy ordered a substantial troop buildup.

The focal point of Soviet and East German harassment was Berlin. There the Communist authorities tried to halt the stream of East German citizens fleeing to the West. The East Germans, aware of the deteriorating situation, were leaving their country in ever greater numbers. When 22,000 left during the first 12 days of August, the East German authorities adopted more drastic measures.

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On 13 August they started to restrict movement between East and West Berlin by closing 67 of the 80 crossing points. Four days later the East German authorities began to construct the Berlin wall, and by 22 August only three crossing points -- one for members of the diplomatic corps and Allied military personnel and two for West German citizens -- were available. The Communist authorities thus succeeded in reestablishing their control over the East German population.

27. (S) The U.S. Reaction

a. In Berlin. To back the U.S. resolution to continue its presence in Berlin, USAREUR reinforced the Berlin garrison with one battle group. The convoy carrying the troops arrived in West Berlin on 20 August.¹

b. The Augmentation of Other USAREUR Forces. The Berlin situation prompted Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to authorize a temporary augmentation of USAREUR forces. He provided approximately 46,000 individual and unit filler spaces to bring combat and service units up to full TCE strength, allow mechanization of the infantry divisions, and enhance combat effectiveness by balancing the force structure. As the first augmentation action the Department of the Army allocated 3,000 spaces to mechanize the infantry divisions. The personnel were airlifted to Europe before 31 October. The mechanization improved the combat posture of the divisions and allowed USAREUR to anticipate the implementation of Reorganization Objective Army Divisions, 1965 (ROAD-65). The remaining personnel followed in November and December.

At the onset of augmentation USAREUR's strength was approximately 225,000 personnel. By the end of 1961 this figure was increased by the arrival of 45,190 unit, filler, and replacement personnel. With the infusion of personnel into combat and service units, mechanization of the infantry divisions, and addition of an armored cavalry regiment for rear-area security, U.S. ground

¹D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953 - 1963 (hereafter cited as USAREUR, 1953 - 1963), USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec, 1964, pp. 43 - 46. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

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forces in Europe enjoyed their strongest posture for limited sustained combat since World War II.²

c. The LOC Augmentation. COMZ received approximately 15,000 personnel, including 12,337 in unit packages. With COMZ strength brought to 97 percent of full authorization, the line of communications was considered capable of supporting the augmented divisions in Germany. If an additional force of six divisions had been deployed to Europe -- as originally planned -- COMZ would have needed 30,987 service and service support personnel who would have had to deploy to Europe 15 days before the scheduled arrival of the combat divisions.³

The first augmentation units specifically programed for COMZ arrived by air on 11 October. They were six movements control detachments that were assigned to the 594th Transportation Group (MC). The 594th, which had responsibility for all movements control, stationed the detachments at crucial points along the LOC through France and on routes from the Bremerhaven port complex. Thus COMZ was ready to schedule and direct the movement of men and supplies that would be funneled to U.S. units in Germany and France. By early November the 594th Transportation Group had directed the movement of over 21,000 USAREUR replacement personnel.⁴

In July 1961 the 4th Logistical Command had replaced the Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM) and had been given operational control of the former TASCOM units, which included the Port Area Command, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and the Orleans and Seine Area Commands, as well as the general depot complexes throughout France and Germany west of the Rhine.

²The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe (1945 - 1963) (hereafter cited as Replacement and Augmentation), USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec, 1964, pp. 55 - 57, 62 - 63. CONF. Gp-3.

³(1) Ibid., p. 63. CONF. (2) USACOMZEUR Anl Hist Rept, 1961, pp. 7 - 12, 164. SECRET (info used CONF).

⁴USACOMZEUR Anl Hist Rept, 1961, pp. 13 - 14. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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With the deployment of the 500-man 1st Logistical Command and its stationing at Poitiers, France, COMZ had a Base Logistical Command (BALOG) that could assume operational control of the French port facilities and depots in western France. The 4th Logistical Command, serving as Advance Logistical Command (ADLOG), could assume responsibility for activities in eastern France and parts of Germany. COMZ designated the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the Orleans and Seine Area Commands as its other major commands.

In November the Department of the Army sent seven Transportation Corps stevedore supervision and documentation teams on temporary duty from Fort Eustis, Virginia, to assist in cargo operations. COMZ used these teams, comprised of 81 personnel, at the ports of La Pallice, Bassens, and St. Nazaire.

By November the augmentation of COMZ and its subordinate commands had been completed, and BALOG and ADLOG had restructured their organizations. By the end of 1961 COMZ was ready.⁵

² Ports and Transportation. One of the major assumptions underlying augmentation planning was that USAREUR would make maximum use of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation to receive men and equipment. The planners opted for that complex, even though it was extremely vulnerable, because it would allow faster through-to-destination movement of augmentation forces and equipment and would be cheaper than movements across France. The latter consideration was important because the Department of Defense had directed that peacetime fiscal and maximum economy policies would be in effect. For the above reasons, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation handled the bulk of shipments during the augmentation of 1961. The port and transportation facilities in France were used only to exercise the LOC capabilities, not to put them to a real test.⁶

(1) Personnel. Approximately 27,000 personnel arrived in Europe by sea during the last three months of 1961. Augmentation units that were to be stationed east of the Paris-Fontainebleau-Orleans area (roughly the ADLOG) arrived at Bremerhaven, and troops destined for western France (the BALOG) landed at Cherbourg

⁵Ibid, pp. 14 - 18, 39 - 41. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

⁶Chronology of USAREUR Troop Augmentation Planning, USAREUR Hist Br, 1966, pp. 22 - 24. SECRET. Gp-4.

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and their equipment at La Pallice. Five ships carrying 4,570 troops docked at Cherbourg, a World War II but not a LOC port. Most of the seaborne units and individual filler personnel destined for Germany landed at Bremerhaven.⁷

(2) Cargo. During the last three months of 1961, 171 cargo ships arrived in Europe, of which 98 docked at the Bremerhaven port complex. Rotterdam, established as a subport of Bremerhaven in 1956, received six ships in November and eight in December. Cargo ships exceeding Bremerhaven's capacity were diverted to Zeebrugge, Hamburg, and other North Sea ports. These developments continued the trend begun in 1955 and illustrated the need for making maximum use of northern ports.

Approximately 285,000 tons of cargo were unloaded at the northern ports to support the augmentation. In September, under normal operations, Bremerhaven received 41,600 tons of cargo; this tonnage increased to 75,400 in October, 144,000 in November, and dropped to 66,200 in December. Included in this tonnage was equipment that was to be prepositioned for the 4th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions and 10 combat service support units.

The LOC ports of La Pallice, Bassens, and St. Nazaire, sharing the cargo workload in France, operated far below capacity, since at the height of incoming shipments in November COMZ was using only 20 percent of the berths available. In all, 73 ships carrying 157,600 tons of non-POL cargo docked at French ports. Thus, the 2:1 ratio, established as early as 1955 for the respective use of the Bremerhaven complex and French ports, was also pertinent to the 1961 augmentation. Donges continued to receive all POL shipments, which rose from a monthly average of approximately 80,000 tons for the first 9 months of 1961 to 125,000 a month during the last quarter.

The roll on, roll off (RORO) ships played an important role in accelerating the movement of supplies. In January 1957 the Department of the Army first tested this new method of shipping cargo and vehicles to Europe. Wheeled and tracked vehicles loaded at U.S. depots with Army-sponsored cargo were driven

⁷(1) USACOMZEUR Anl Hist Rept, 1961, pp. 26 - 27.
SECRET. (2) Replacement and Augmentation, cited above, p. 59.
CONF. Gp-3.

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Date 31 AUG 90

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directly onto the vessels at the port of origin, shipped across the Atlantic, and then driven off at the European port for onward movement to final destinations. The merits of the system were in the reduction of documentation, economy of both time and money in loading and discharging, reduction in cargo delays because of bad weather, shortening of the supply cycle, and better use of harbor berths and facilities. In 1958 the first special RORO ship was put into service. During the 1961 augmentation the RORO system was used extensively, and in November 2,700 vehicles with equipment were off-loaded at the Bremerhaven port complex.⁸

(3) Planning for Further Buildup. If division-size units had been sent to Europe, the troops and their equipment would have arrived only in French ports and would have traveled by truck or train to the Federal Republic. On the assumption that the French LOC ports and Cherbourg would be operating at maximum levels, COMZ considered secondary ports and presented the French Liaison Mission with a list of additional ports it would need. Included in this list were Le Havre and Dunkerque, both of which the French authorities refused to make available for U.S. use because they were being used to full capacity. As a result, COMZ intended to move 40 percent of the incoming buildup troops and cargo over French beaches near LOC facilities.⁹

28. (S) The Prepositioning of Equipment

a. Basic Concepts. During the 1961 augmentation USCINCEUR, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, devised the concept of prepositioning organizational equipment for several divisions in Europe while holding the personnel in the United States ready to move on call. The primary feature of this concept was the rapid response of large unequipped troop units that would deploy by air, draw their prepositioned equipment, and be ready for combat within a maximum period of 14 days.

After some preliminary planning, the Department of Defense directed on 12 October the prepositioning of equipment for the 4th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions and gave 7 December as

⁸(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Repts, FY 1957, p. 257, and FY 1958, p. 244. (2) USACOMZEUR Anl Hist Rept, 1961, chart on p. 28, p. 29. All SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁹USACOMZEUR Anl Hist Rept, 1961, pp. 26 - 27. SECRET.

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the target date for completion. Some 3,000 port and caretaker personnel -- 700 for the port package, and 2,300 for liaison and maintenance (L&M) detachments of the two divisions -- were to deploy to Europe temporarily. By 15 November these personnel had arrived.

Before making a decision on USAREUR's request that the equipment for essential combat support units also be prepositioned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff inquired whether USAREUR could support these forces from its own resources for the 21 to 24 days that would elapse before the remainder of the support units reached Europe and became operational. When USAREUR replied that it could render full support temporarily on a peacetime augmentation basis, and austere support on a wartime augmentation basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the prepositioning of TOE equipment for 10 support units for the 2 divisions, with essential L&M detachments. The target date established for prepositioning the equipment for support units was 3 January 1962.

The short notice for implementing the prepositioning plan caused numerous difficulties. Sites for storage of equipment were often hastily chosen, and relocations became necessary as new procedures developed. To meet the established target date, items not available in Europe had to be requisitioned from the United States in half the normal supply time. Equipment from USAREUR sources often was in need of servicing, and caretaker personnel at first did not possess sufficient maintenance skills. The latter point was partly solved in October 1962, when USAREUR assumed the maintenance responsibilities from the L&M detachments. Procedures evolved as time passed, and such operational tests as the LONG THRUST series and BIG LIFT proved invaluable in finding and correcting deficiencies.¹⁰

b. Procurement and Movement. USAREUR experienced numerous difficulties in furnishing all the TOE equipment that was to be

¹⁰(1) After Action Report, Prepositioning for a Two Division Force (hereafter cited as After Action Report) Hq USAREUR, 1962, pp. 16 - 17. (2) R. A. Hafner and C. F. Blozan, Study of the Prepositioning Concepts Prior to BIG LIFT, Research Analysis Corporation Field Office, Europe (RACFOE), Technical Study (hereafter cited as RACFOE Study), Hq Seventh Army, July 1964, pp. 23 - 26, 28, 66 - 67. CONF. Gp-4.

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prepositioned for the 2d Armored Division and for the 4th Infantry Division less three battle groups. To provide the necessary major items it had to tap theater reserves and use excesses of limited standard equipment generated by the modernization program. On 12 October 1961 the Department of the Army authorized the reduction of TR-1 stocks to a 60-day level, if necessary, to meet requirements and the target dates. USAREUR directed the shipment of some tanks from Camp Darby, Italy; it also used excess M-38 and M-38A1 1/4-ton trucks, M-59 armored personnel carriers (APC's), and M-48A1 tanks traded in by line units that received more modern items. Theater resources were insufficient to provide aircraft and tank recovery vehicles for the 2-division force, and USAREUR planned to reallocate these items from active units on an on-call basis if necessary. The 4th Infantry Division provided the TOE equipment for its three battle groups, and other items were requisitioned from U.S. depots.

The close target dates and the possibility of having to move the divisions to Europe necessitated rapid screening of available equipment and prompt requisitioning of unavailable items. On 17 October COMZ requisitioned the unavailable items; six days later it dispatched requirements to replenish command assets of parts and ammunition to be used for basic, prescribed, and maintenance loads; and by the 28th requisitions went out to reconstitute TR-1 levels. By the end of December COMZ had prepositioned all Class I and III supplies, 85 to 90 percent of medical Class II and IV supplies, and 3,320.8 tons of the required 3,418.1 tons of Class V. USAREUR had completed the prepositioning of supplies for the two divisions by 4 January 1962.

The prepositioning of major equipment items extended over a longer period because of late shipments and the unavailability of some signal equipment, tank recovery vehicles, and engineer equipment. In early December 1961 USAREUR developed prepositioning priorities to meet the urgent LONG THRUST exercise requirements. The three battle groups that composed the LONG THRUST task force were given first priority, followed by the remainder of the 4th Infantry Division, and finally the major items of equipment for the 2d Armored Division. By 2 May 1962 practically all major items of equipment had been prepositioned. Thereafter, the main effort changed to improving maintenance, correcting deficiencies, and developing better storage methods for the prepositioned equipment.¹¹

¹¹(1) After Action Report, pp. 13 - 21; Anx D (Logistics), p. 11. (2) RACFOE Study, pp. 26, 38. Both cited above. CONF. Gp-4. (3) USACOMZEUR Anl Hist Repts, 1961, pp. 33 - 34, and 1962, pp. 66 - 67.

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Date 31 AUG 90 MR. B. F. Hiller
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As previously mentioned, the bulk of the prepositioned equipment requisitioned from the United States arrived through the Bremerhaven complex together with the augmentation cargo. Time was the most important factor in the use of Bremerhaven for these shipments. The transportation distances from the ports to the storage sites were shorter, and planners estimated that they could save 40 to 60 days by shipping through Bremerhaven rather than through French ports and over French railroads. Transportation costs were another significant factor. For example, the approximate cost for shipping a ton of cargo to Mannheim, Germany, was \$8.41 from Rotterdam and \$9.96 from Bremerhaven, while the cost from French ports was \$24.30. About 90 percent of the equipment to be prepositioned arrived through the Bremerhaven complex, mainly on RORO ships. The only problem of any consequence in port operations was the mixing of augmentation cargo with equipment earmarked for prepositioning.

Once assembled, the cargo was moved by rail or truck to storage sites in Germany. Drivers from the L&M detachments, who arrived in Europe before the cargo shipments, were used to shuttle wheeled vehicles and trailers from the ports to the storage sites. Tracked vehicles went by rail, as did equipment arriving in France. Thirty-four M-48 tanks were sent by rail from Camp Darby through Switzerland to Germany. This method was much cheaper than any other type of shipment through France, but special clearances were necessary before the tanks could pass through neutral Switzerland.¹²

c. Storage Sites. USAREUR's storage plans called for the dispersion of most of the prepositioned equipment at sites along and west of the Rhine River. Two basic considerations determined the selection of sites: their relation to available maintenance facilities and troop housing and messing areas, and the safety of equipment in the 14-day period before the anticipated arrival of personnel. On 25 October the Department of the Army approved the proposed sites and directed implementation.

The equipment of the 4th Infantry Division, first in priority to be prepositioned, was assembled at sites near Mannheim and Karlsruhe, except for the equipment of two LONG THRUST battle groups, which was stored at Wildflecken and Augsburg. The equipment for the 2d Armored Division was prepositioned far enough

¹²After Action Report, cited above, pp. 1 - 8, App 7 (Transportation) to Anx D (Logistics). CONF.

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west of the Rhine so that the troops could draw it without fear of being overrun. The sites selected on this basis were at Kaiserslautern, Pirmasens, and Germersheim in Germany, and at Cheneviers Air Base in France; in 1963, in conjunction with preparations for Exercise BIG LIFT, USAREUR transferred the equipment stored in France to sites at Idar-Oberstein and Lorschwald, thereby reducing gold-flow expenditures and conserving COMZ and Seventh Army personnel resources.¹³

d. Operational Tests.

(1) LONG THRUST Series. In 1960 the Joint Chiefs of Staff first proposed to hold a strategic mobility exercise and to deploy a composite force to Europe. The first two LONG THRUST exercises, scheduled for 1961, had to be canceled because of crises in Laos and Berlin. When the first exercise was rescheduled for 1962, the 4th Infantry Division was substituted for an airborne division that had been included in earlier planning. Three battle groups were to deploy by air to Rhein Main Air Base in Germany, draw their prepositioned equipment, and travel to Hohenfels for a field exercise. After the exercise one battle group would reposition its equipment and redeploy to the United States, one would replace the augmentation battle group in Berlin, and the third would be stationed in Augsburg.

LONG THRUST IIA began on 16 January 1962 with the movement of the three battle groups to Europe. Their 5,290 personnel and 439.6 tons of personal equipment arrived over the next 6 days. The units drew their prepositioned equipment and by 30 January were in Hohenfels ready for the field exercise. LONG THRUST IIA was instrumental in reducing delays in deployment and practicing the drawing of equipment and redeployment. The deficiencies uncovered during the exercise were caused by hasty planning and implementation and by shortages of supplies needed for the maintenance of the prepositioned equipment.

During the remainder of 1962 and in 1963 USAREUR conducted seven additional LONG THRUST exercises until they became routine operations. Deficiencies in equipment storage and maintenance

¹³(1) Ibid., pp. 10 - 11. CONF. (2) CMT 2, USAREUR OEngr to DCSOPS, 7 May 1968, subj: Review of Draft Monograph "U.S. Army Lines of Communications in Europe (1945 - 1967)." AEAEN-MO. UNCLAS.

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continued to plague the prepositioning concept, but such programs as ROAD-65 promised to eliminate much of the older equipment that had been prepositioned, and the control of humidity was expected to keep the equipment in better condition while stored. The experience gained and corrective measures introduced during the LONG THRUST series were to be tested in Exercise BIG LIFT involving an entire division.

(2) Exercise BIG LIFT. In May 1963 planning began for a division-size exercise that was to test the prepositioned armored equipment for the first time and provide data on maintenance and equipment reliability. Five months later, on 22 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the movement of the entire 2d Armored Division plus several support units to Europe. Over the next 63 hours, 14,851 personnel arrived at 3 air bases in Germany and 2 in France, from which they were transported to the prepositioned equipment sites. Within 2 1/2 days the division had drawn its equipment and closed at the assembly area near Darmstadt, Germany. Thus, in seven days the division personnel, along with individual clothing and weapons, had deployed from the United States, drawn the prepositioned equipment, and deployed in the field -- one-half the time envisioned in the original prepositioning concept.

During the 7-day exercise the 2d Armored Division and its equipment were tested for operational reliability in the field. The equipment performed well, mainly because sufficient time for maintenance had been provided before the deployment of the division. After BIG LIFT, refinements in storage and maintenance continued as part of routine activities.¹⁴

¹⁴(1) Replacement and Augmentation, pp. 66 - 70.
(2) RACFOE Study, pp. 34 - 35, 65 - 69. Both cited above.
CONF. (3) Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, 1963, pp. 5 - 16, 25.
SECRET (info used CONF). (4) USAREUR, 1953 - 1963, cited
above, p. 170. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

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